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The Taksim-Gezi protests began on May 27, 2013, as a small campaign against 
redevelopment. The initial aim of those who gathered in Taksim Square was to stop 
developers from building an Ottoman-style shopping center that was to be housed in a replica 
of a military barracks building demolished 60 years ago. There are numerous shopping malls 
in İstanbul -- at least one in every neighborhood -- but only very few public green spaces.  
The main objection of the protesters was that the building of the shopping center would result 
in the destruction of much of Gezi Park, one of the last green spots remaining in central 
İstanbul (Europe’s biggest city and the business capital of Turkey). However, the character of 
the protests changed when the Turkish police attacked demonstrators with overwhelming 
force and what started out as an environmental protest in İstanbul quickly turned into a 
nationwide political demonstration against the policies of then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and his government. The protest rapidly gained support from a cross-section of 
society in İstanbul and other urban centers, leading to what was arguably the largest wave of 
protests in recent Turkish history. An estimated 3.5 million people took part in the protests 
over the course of the following few months. The protests were generally led and dominated 
by young urban professionals and university students and while they expressed a wide range 
of demands including wider access to resources and freedom of expression, desire for a new 
kind of urban living remained at the center of events. 
It is no coincidence that the demonstrations started and were concentrated in İstanbul, the 
largest and the most developed urban center in Turkey. İstanbul is a unique example of 
contemporary urban development, with wide-scale urban transformation and regeneration 
projects in place. In the 1980s, soon after the Sept. 12, 1980, military coup in Turkey, the city 
witnessed the beginning of the neoliberal transformation and the celebration of urban 
property regeneration in line with transformations that had occurred in other metropolitan 
centers such as New York, London and Madrid since the 1960s. Metropolitan cities now have 
central significance in the system of global capitalist surplus production, renowned Marxist 
geographer David Harvey writes: “It is the metropolis that now constitutes a vast common 
produced by the collective labour expended on and in the city. The right to use that common 
must surely then be accorded to all those who have had a part in producing it. This is, of 
course, the basis for the claim to the right to the city on the part of the collective labourers 
who have made it. The struggle for the right to the city is against the powers of capital that 
ruthlessly feed upon and extract rents from the common life that others have produced.”1 
In this sense, the Taksim-Gezi protests share common ground with a great many diverse 
social movements focusing on the urban question in countries such as India, Brazil, China, 
Spain, Argentina and the US.2 Just a few months before the Taksim-Gezi protests started, 
Harvey spoke about the urban origins of the social movements and discussed İstanbul’s rapid 
urbanization, asking: “What do we see in İstanbul? Cranes, everywhere.”3 According to 
Harvey, urbanization is a channel through which surplus capital flows to build/ re-build cities 
for those who can afford it. In his contribution to the analysis of the contemporary capitalist 
production process, Harvey says that such urban re-generation is a powerful and essential 
course of action that in return defines what contemporary cities are about, as well as 
determining who can afford to live in these redesigned urban spaces and who cannot. The 
cities also happen to be the quintessential places where the contestation of neoliberal 
urbanization may take place in various forms and with different intensities. On the basis of 
this analysis, Harvey highlights the importance of challenging the state and addresses the 
ever-changing ideal of the city and the social groups that sustain and contest it. 
The mainstream terminology used by the Western media and experts and shared by some 
left/liberal accounts, both in Turkey and abroad, makes comparisons between Taksim and 
Tahrir Square in Egypt by discussing the ability of the street to topple a government. Some 
even claimed that “the Gezi Park resistance is a [revolutionary] turning point for the people 
of Turkey. After many decades they feel their power again.”4 However tempting, this 
reviewer believes such comparisons represent a gross over-simplification, based on a range of 
superficial similarities, many of which ignore social and political-economic differences 
between “Arab Spring” countries and Turkey. The political-economic roots of the events in 
Turkey are very different from those of its war-torn Arab neighbors; that is, the majority of 
Turkish protesters are young urban people, many with jobs or university students with 
reasonably good job prospects, rather than being unemployed and economically desperate, as 
many of the young people who took to the Arab streets were.  
Turkey’s protests also need to be distinguished from the discontent expressed in some of its 
European neighbors, such as Greece and Spain, where weak economies brought unemployed 
youth onto the streets. The riot police in Turkey employed considerable use of force against 
the Taksim-Gezi protesters, not unlike Spanish, Italian, Greek and British police tactics 
during the same months, when hundreds of thousands of protestors marched to protest their 
governments’ austerity policies. In those European countries, comparable levels of police 
force were employed to pacify the protesters. Interestingly, however, none of these European 
events were considered a British, Greek or Spanish “Spring.” 
Undoubtedly, the two events that the majority of accounts compare -- those of Turkey and 
Egypt -- started and centered in two symbolic squares -- Tahrir and Taksim. Just like Tahrir 
Square, Taksim has become a strong reminder of the power of public space; a number of 
normally rigorously competing football fans unified in their opposition to their governments’ 
policies, leaving aside their historical differences to defend “their city,” while protesters 
demanded the resignation of the government in both cases and the both police forces 
responded with violence.5 The similarities end here, but nevertheless, some articles in the 
mainstream media focused on the Turkish government’s Islamism and the presence of secular 
groups within the demonstrations, presenting Turkey’s protests as yet another example of an 
Oriental Muslim dictator oppressing his mostly secular subjects. These interpretations tend to 
simplify complex and multi-layered events into gratifying morality tales about Western 
democratic secularists versus conservative Islamists.6 They are also ethnocentric, presenting 
Muslims in clichés and run the risk of creating a cultural caricature.7 
The books reviewed here are relatively recent volumes dealing with many of the 
abovementioned aspects, but unfortunately neither moves beyond existing gross over-
simplifications, rather they repeat them in a variety of forms. They are quite different in their 
coverage and each puts forward a significantly different central argument, even if it is not 
always easy to identify. The first book, “The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey,” 
edited by Umut Özkırımlı, has nine short chapters, an introduction by the editor and a 
forward by Judith Butler. Butler’s forward is intensive, interesting and sophisticated but does 
not really deal with the Taksim Gezi movement(s) directly. It is useful as a general reflection 
based on various observations in the context of urban protest movements in our times. 
In Özkırımlı’s introduction, the book starts with a rather ambitious claim: “Much ink has 
been spilled since June 2013 to explain Gezi protests in the media, both domestic and 
international, most of it based on hasty analogues and banal platitudes […] no academic 
analyses of the protests have been published so far. […] We believe there is an urgent need 
for an intervention that attempts to offer a sober and critical reflection on the eighteen days 
that shook the model.” However, two paragraphs later, Özkırımlı says that, “it is important to 
stress at the outset that we do not, in fact cannot, purport to offer a well-rounded analysis of 
the specific factors or the more general dynamics that have generated these protests as it is 
still too early to fully grasp the nature of the events.”(p.3) 
There have been many books and hundreds of articles published on the Taksim Gezi protests 
before the publication date of Özkırımlı’s volume, many based on participant observations 
and interviews with protesters, and some more general political and social analyses. Even 
though the majority of these accounts fall in the category of gross over-simplification, there 
are some original and critical analyses that help us understand both the dynamics of the 
protest movements and the more general conditions that led to these protests.8 After reading 
all the chapters in this book, this reviewer unfortunately concludes that he cannot find any 
basis for Özkırımlı’s ambitious and strongly put claims at the start. All the chapters provide 
some useful accounts and reflections of the events that help the reader to make sense of the 
Taksim-Gezi movements, yet none provide us with anything really original and different 
from what Özkırımlı calls “non-scholarly” accounts. 
The second volume reviewed here is “Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey’s Gezi Park,” by 
Efe Can Gürcan and Efe Peker. The main difference of this book is explained at the start by 
the authors as being that the book “seeks to contribute to the Marxist analysis of the GPPs 
[Gezi Park protests] by focusing on its structural correlation of class forces, material-
objective conditions and conjunctural opportunities, organizational forms, and articulation of 
political consciousness.”(pp. 8-9) This attempt to prove the “working-class basis” of the Gezi 
Park protest(s) stays at the center of the book for the remaining 160 pages. This volume, it 
seems, was written as a counter argument against what the authors call “liberal-leftist figures 
in Turkey.” Even though it is not really clear what the authors mean by this label, this 
reviewer assumes the label corresponds to a group of influential Marxian intellectuals who do 
not share these two authors’ rather strict but not necessarily clear interpretation of Marxism. 
The authors criticize these so-called liberal-leftist authors for “employing buzzwords such as 
hegemony, historical bloc, the state, and ideology.”9 Ironically, one is repeatedly bombarded 
in this book, on almost every single page, with the over-usage of another set of buzzwords 
such as “Marxist framework,” “wage-earning class fractions” and “working-class fractions.” 
The authors here use Richard Edwards’s definition of the working class as made up of three 
fractions including all wage-earners and most salaried employees, thereby including 
technicians, professionals, supervisors and middle management, and indeed all non-
capitalists.(pp. 38, 43-44, 49) This definition, exclusively based on Edwards’s observations of 
the working class(es) in the US, is synonymous with the category “labour.”10 This reviewer 
has a serious problem with the usage of the term “working class fractions”; every worker is a 
wage-earner, but not all wage-earners can be said to be workers. Many workers in Turkey – 
approximately  70 percent of all workers -- earn TL 1,200, the minimum wage, or around that 
figure. Many professionals such as engineers earn at least four times this amount as a starting 
salary. Middle managers earn much more -- up to 10 times of the average salary of a worker. 
Of course, company managers’ astronomic earnings cannot even be compared to the 
minimum wage. All these people qualify as “wage-earners.” So, considering all wage-earners 
to form part of the working class(es) is not very helpful; rather, it is an absurd attempt to 
prove that the middle-class(es) are actually members of the working class(es). 
This reviewer found this volume frustrating for the most part because the authors use terms 
without explaining how they are being used, thereby failing to make them clear and precise. 
The book amounts to a confused jumble, a complete misrepresentation of Marx and his class 
analysis. 
*** 
The Taksim Gezi protests were democratic protest movements in a society that has 
experienced rapid change over the last 15 years and where the public’s demand for better 
services and more democracy at the local and national levels is growing at a faster pace than 
their governments’ ability and willingness to provide them. 
In a clear sense, in Turkey, participatory democracy has been forcefully diluted amid an orgy 
of neoliberal mega-projects, generating dubious profits for a small elite around the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AK Party), given the AK Party’s collusion with powerful 
business interests in the so-called re-development of İstanbul. This is a common feature of 
the contemporary capitalist system in the context of so-called urban re-development and 
cultural investment in and around many modern metropolitan centers. This is justified by an 
economic argument around the importance to capitalism of land, rent and speculation, more 
so than straightforward production. As Harvey notes, “[O]ver the past 30-40 years, where 
cities try to brand themselves and sell a piece of their history. What is the image of a city? Is 
it attractive to tourists? Is it trendy? So a city will market itself.”11 
There are many passages describing this situation in David Harvey’s “Rebel Cities,” such as: 
Much of the corruption that attaches to urban politics relates to how 
public investments are allocated to produce something that looks like a 
common but which promotes gains in private asset values for privileged 
property owners. The distinction between urban public goods and 
urban commons is both fluid and dangerously porous. How often are 
development projects subsidized by the state in the name of the common 
interest when the true beneficiaries are a few landholders, financiers, 
and developers?12 
The events in Turkey in 2013 illustrate how the authorities responded to the public when their 
“grand” projects of neoliberal restructuring were challenged by their citizens, many of whom 
may have voted for the ruling party.  
Despite the multiplication of slogans and the emerging chaos about the aims of the protesters, 
it is important to note that the protests of Turkey’s urban youth are first and foremost a 
response to the ruling regimes’ grandiose neoliberal projects of urban transformation, their 
gentrifying schemes with the aim of creating high-tech malls and skyscrapers and other 
expensive, grandiose projects. All this is part of the “violent neoliberal attack upon the public 
provision of social public goods over the last thirty years or more.”13 
It is also important to take note of the educated urban youth at the forefront of the resistance 
to such a neoliberal assault. To many analysts, young people’s role in the protest movements 
came as a surprise, because young people had been identified as apolitical and individualistic 
for decades. With the protest movements in the summer of 2013, urban youth proved that 
they cared about how the current policies of their governments affect their lives, their urban 
space, their country and their fellow citizens, and that they are willing to protest resiliently. 
Turkish youth were protesting because they were upset -- and rightly so -- about the priorities 
of their government for their cities and the manner in which these priorities were pursued 
without sufficient consultation. They demanded the right to participate in the planning and 
distribution of their country’s resources and to be heard and involved, linked to the feeling 
that they were not really able to be part of the decision-making that would alter their 
conceived urban space and day-to-day lives. They wanted the right to determine their own 
futures; they were no longer prepared to be talked down to by the government.14 The protests 
can in one general sense be read as the articulation by those involved of what a fair and just 
world might be.15 Rejecting the neoliberal notion that democracy and markets are the same, 
Turkish youth not only addressed some of the current injustices while reclaiming their urban 
space, but also began to produce new ideas with a new and very imaginative political 
language. 
In the final analysis, the 2013 urban protest movements in Turkey represent these political 
and social struggles (struggles over the city, and its urbanization), at least the beginning of 
them. They were direct responses by youth in search of “a different way of urban living from 
that which was being imposed upon them by capitalist developers and the state.”16 In this 
reviewer’s view, the demonstrations can be connected to a wider discussion, first introduced 
by Henri Lefebvre in 196817 and recently developed by David Harvey around “the right to 
the city,” which is a right to democratic control over the process of urbanization. The specific 
aims of the protesters in İstanbul and other urban centers to keep a green space as a public 
park and defend affordable transportation fees for the urban public are in a general sense their 
attempt to reclaim their city, their urban space. Whatever the initial results or lack of specific 
gains of the recent protests, in 2013Turkish youth created “a critical mass of political energy” 
for a “struggle to fashion an alternative to globalisation that does not trade on monopoly rents 
in particular or cave in to multinational capitalism in general,” and initiated “a platform for 
what an alternative urbanization project might look like.”18 
The Taksim-Gezi protests showed that the relationship between the economic and social 
development of a country and the democratization of its political system is complex. This 
reviewer, however, believes that it would be safe to claim that there is a fragile but essential 
link between being strong economic development and establishing a stable democratic 
system in the long run: One cannot survive long without the other. Neither tends to last long 
in the conditions of the absence of the other. Today, despite its recent economic problems, 
Turkey is still a rising power, with its internationally competitive companies tapping cash-
rich export markets in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East while still attracting 
some investment in return. However, all this progress will require a stable and functioning 
democracy to survive. It is not possible for Turkey to be a credible world power without 
achieving fully functioning democratic status, including freedom of expression and 
democratic rights. There is no exception to this; all existing evidence from transition 
countries point to this same conclusion. Turkey can become a genuine global power and a 
country at peace with the majority of its citizens only when its economic progress is matched 
by a strong, stable and functioning democratic system. 
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